The distinguished linguist and controversial political critic combines both aspects of his life and work in this wide-ranging and informative discussion that presents his political, moral, and linguistic views on current issues.

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, EarlyView.

Abstract: What follows is a contribution to the field of user modeling for adaptive teaching and learning programs especially in the medical field. The paper outlines existing approaches to the problem of extracting user information in a form that can be exploited by adaptive software. We focus initially on the so-called stereotyping method, which allocates users into classes adaptively, reflecting characteristics such as physical data, social background, and computer experience. The user classifications of the stereotyping method are however ad hoc (...) and unprincipled, and they can be exploited by the adaptive system only after a large number of trials by various kinds of users. We argue that the remedy is to create a database of user ontologies from which readymade taxonomies can be derived in such a way as to enable associated software to support a variety of different types of users. (shrink)

When this classic work was first published in 1976, its central tenet--more is not necessarily better--placed it in direct conflict with mainstream thought in economics. Within a few years, however, this apparently paradoxical claim was gaining wide acceptance. Scitovsky's ground-breaking book was the first to apply theories of behaviorist psychology to questions of consumer behavior and to do so in clear, non-technical language. Setting out to analyze the failures of our consumerist lifestyle, Scitovsky concluded that people's need for stimulation (...) is so vital that it can lead to violence if not satisfied by novelty--whether in challenging work, art, fashion, gadgets, late-model cars, or scandal. Though much of the book stands as a record of American post-war prosperity and its accompanying problems, the revised edition also takes into account recent social and economic changes. A new preface and a foreword by economist Robert Frank introduce some of the issues created by those changes and two revised chapters develop them, discussing among others the assimilation of counter-cultural ideas throughout American society, especially ideas concerning quality of life. Scitovsky draws fascinating connections between the new elite of college-educated consumers and the emergence of a growing underclass plagued by drugs and violence, perceptively tracing the reactions of these disparate groups to the problems of leisure and boredom. In the wake of the so-called "decade of greed" and amidst calls for a "kindler, gentler" society, The Joyless Economy seems more timely than ever. (shrink)

We investigate properties of accessible categories with directed colimits and their relationship with categories arising from ShelahʼsElementary Classes. We also investigate ranks of objects in accessible categories, and the effect of accessible functors on ranks.

The philosophical problem of pictorial conversational implicatures can be summarized as follows: We have three propositions that are independently plausible and jointly inconsistent. -/- (Non-P) Anti-propositionalism: pictures do not have context-independent, conventionally encoded propositional content (propositional function). -/- (C) Only those representations can be used to convey conversational implicatures which have associated with them a context-independent, conventionally encoded propositional content (function). -/- (I) Pictures can be used to convey conversational implicatures. -/- There are three ways of responding to the (...) problem: affirm (Non-P) and (C) while denying (I); affirm (C) and (I) while denying (Non-P); or affirm (Non-P) and (I) while denying (C). (shrink)

Some consequences of direct realism and William James’s philosophy of mind are considered in terms of American naturalism as seen in the debate between John Dewey and Roy Wood Sellars. Sellars’s critical realism and evolutionary naturalism is compared and contrasted with Dewey’s pragmatic realism and emphatically evolutionary naturalism. Though these naturalisms are similar, there are significant differences between methodology, their critiques of James’s reflex arc concept in his Principles of Psychology, and the mind-body problem. Sellars’s critical realism and naturalism (...) retains a priori commitments to fixed categories and concepts, whereas Dewey’s emphatically evolutionary pragmatic naturalism is empirical and sees continuities where Sellars insists on discontinuities. One significant difference is Sellars’s maintaining a place for introspection as methodologically appropriate and Dewey’s’ rejection of it. These differences are illustrated through Sellars’s modification of the reflex arc to include an organic but interpretative step, and Dewey’s radical criticism of approaches like James’s and Sellars’s as recapitulating the Cartesian dualism that such views intended to overcome. These differences are finally contrasted in Sellars’s maintaining a privacy of mind by constraining it to the brain in a dual-aspect theory, while Dewey advocates mind as sociocultural, expanding mind into body and world. (shrink)

The following letters were written by the distinguished British chemist Professor Brian G. Gowenlock in response to Tibor Frank’s article on “Networking, Cohorting, Bonding: Michael Polanyi in Exile,” Tradition and Discovery 23:2 : 5-19. The two letters contribute to the history of the Manchester years of Michael Polanyi with interesting details concerning several of his colleagues and contemporaries. These informative comments by a former student of Michael Polanyi will improve our knowledge of the last years of Polanyi as (...) a physical chemist. (shrink)

Recent work in neurophilosophy has either made reference to the work of John Dewey or independently developed positions similar to it. I review these developments in order first to show that Dewey was indeed doing neurophilosophy well before the Churchlands and others, thereby preceding many other mid-twentieth century European philosophers’ views on cognition to whom many present day philosophers refer (e.g., Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty). I also show that Dewey’s work provides useful tools for evading or overcoming many issues in contemporary neurophilosophy (...) and philosophy of mind. In this introductory review, I distinguish between three waves among neurophilosophers that revolve around the import of evolution and the degree of brain-centrism. Throughout, I emphasize and elaborate upon Dewey’s dynamic view of mind and consciousness. I conclude by introducing the consciousness-as-cooking metaphor as an alternative to both the consciousness-as-digestion and consciousness-as-dancing metaphors. Neurophilosophical pragmatism—or neuropragmatism—recognizes the import of evolutionary and cognitive neurobiology for developing a science of mind and consciousness. However, as the cooking metaphor illustrates, a science of mind and consciousness cannot rely on the brain alone—just as explaining cooking entails more than understanding the gut—and therefore must establish continuity with cultural activities and their respective fields of inquiry. Neuropragmatism advances a new and promising perspective on how to reconcile the scientific and manifest images of humanity as well as how to reconstruct the relationship between science and the humanities. (shrink)

Neuropragmatism offers a non-dualistic conception of experience from which scientific inquiries can provide resources for sociocultural critique. This reconstructive effort addresses what Emma Dowling calls the care crisis without succumbing to what Mike W. Martin calls therapeutic tyranny. This tyranny relies on problematic dualisms, between mind/body, mind/world, and fact/value, that are also found in neuropsychoanalysis. While pragmatism and psychoanalysis more generally share an evolutionary perspective and can overlap in therapeutic approaches, neuropsychoanalysis diverges from this effort in its dual-aspect monism and (...) positivistic conception of science. Where neuropsychoanalysis seeks to reconcile the first-person subjectivity of lived experience with the third-person objectivity of science, neuropragmatism offers reconstruction. In taking the neuropragmatic turn, neuropsychoanalysts can better utilize Freudian therapies in conjunction with active inference principles, such as the free-energy principle and allostasis. Along with neuropragmatism’s conception of experience as organism-environment dynamic engagement, neuropsychoanalysis can benefit from allostatic approaches to experience and inquiry without reducing experience to brute mechanism or denying the utility of such mechanisms for prediction and intervention. Understanding the value-ladenness of experience, primary and secondary, in everyday waking life and in reflective inquiry, empowers people to better care for themselves without succumbing to merely coping with neoliberal oppression. (shrink)

Pragmatism has resurged explicitly in neopragmatism and implicitly in neurophilosophy. Neopragmatists have focused primarily on ideals, like human freedom, but at the expense of science. Neurophilosophers have focused primarily on scientific facts, but with an eye toward dismissing aspects of our self-conception like free will as illusory. In both cases, these resurgences are impoverished as each neglects what Dewey referred to as the method of intelligence. Neurophilosophical pragmatism - neuropragmatism - aims to overcome the deficiencies of neopragmatism and neurophilosophy (...) by carrying forth the project of reconstruction by taking both the methods and results of experimental inquiry as the means for attaining ends-in-view such as human freedom. (shrink)

I address the problem of caring for our body-mind through neuropragmatism, cybernetics, and Larry Hickman’s work on John Dewey and the philosophy of technology. The problems of body-mind health are related to Emma Dowling’s The Care Crisis. I address this crisis by drawing on Jay Schulkin’s conception of viability as the creative tension between stability and precarity. From this, I extend body-mind health to questions of democracy, leading to the proposal of body-mind-world as an elaboration of neuropragmatism’s evolutionary and ecological (...) conception of experience as Œ and Hickman’s distinction between the merely valued nature-as-nature and the valuable nature-as-culture. I conclude with a reimagination of creative democracy as a moral ideal for dealing with the care crisis. (shrink)

How have broad patterns of violence and war changed from the dawn of humanity up to present time? In answering this question, researchers have typically framed their arguments and evidence in terms of the polarized debate between Hobbes (or hawks) and Rousseau (or doves). This article moves beyond the stalemated debate and integrates the most robust existing theoretical developments and empirical findings that have emerged from various disciplines over the past 20 years– primarily sociology, political science, anthropology, and archaeology– to (...) answer the question. Drawing on carefully curated violent lethality data for pre historically appropriate hunter-gatherers, as well as historical pre-state and state societies, it shows that simple narratives of violence and war decreasing through history from ostensibly high levels in the human state of nature, on the one hand, and the obverse insistence that the once mostly peaceful communities became highly belligerent with the transition to modernity, on the other, are both wrong. Instead, multiple lines of existing evidence and theoretical perspectives suggest a complex, non-linear, Kuznets-style relationship between violence and the passage of history. (shrink)

Spencer Dimmock has produced a convincing restatement, defence and update of Robert Brenner’s influential work on the origin of capitalism in England. The book productively engages with many Marxist and non-Marxist critics of the so-called ‘Brenner Thesis’, and presents fresh secondary and primary evidence in favour of it. This review sketches the theoretical background of Brenner’s intervention, summarises Dimmock’s take on Brenner, and comments on a few notable contemporary critiques of Brenner’s general framework which are not explicitly engaged (...) class='Hi'>with by Dimmock. (shrink)

János Erdelyi: The Individual and the Ideal Individuality and ideality are the two principles according to which aesthetes yesterday and today interpret art. But individuality must have priority because the systems of ideality, established for instance by Winckelmann and Schiller, produce nothing but lifeless, abstract and uniform figures who represent a concept or the genus. Individuality, on the contrary, is an analogon to nature where everything has its end and sense in itself, and everything must be judged by itself. This (...) is the difference between the figures and works of Shakespeare and those of the idealizing authors. Individuality, however, does not simply mean the imitation of nature; rather it means a well-balanced synthesis of the material and the spiritual in something characteristic. This renders the objection of ugliness invalid, too, because it only pertains to the sensual perception, that is the beginning of perception. Those identifying the beautiful with the ideal are also at risk of insisting on objects which in the course of time lose their novelty and power. The study by the Hungarian aesthete and literary critic János Erdélyi, written in 1847, is an important attempt to enforce the principle ‘life as it is’ in the philosophy of art. (shrink)

Cognitive science and its philosophy have been far too long consumed with representation. This concern is indicative of a creeping Cartesianism that many scientists and philosophers wish to evade. However, their naturalism is often insufficiently evolutionary to fully appreciate the lessons of pragmatism. If cognitive neuroscience and pragmatism are to be mutually beneficial, the representational-friendly scientists and the anti-representational pragmatists need an alternative to representation that still accounts for what many find so attractive about representation, namely intentionality. I propose (...) that instead of representations we philosophers and scientists begin thinking in terms of cultural affordances. Like Gibsonian affordances, cultural affordances are opportunities for action. However, unlike Gibsonian affordances, which are merely biological and available for immediate action in the immediately present environment, cultural affordances also present opportunities for thinking about the past and acting into the future—tasks typically attributed to representations. (shrink)

In pathological conditions associated with persistent increases in hemodynamic workload (old myocardial infarction, high blood pressure, valvular heart disease), a number of signalling pathways are activated in the heart, all of which promote hypertrophic growth of the heart, characterised at the cellular level by increases in individual cardiac myocyte size. Some of these pathways are required for a successful adaptation to cardiac injury. Other pathways are maladaptive, however, as they lead to progressive contractile dysfunction and heart failure. The free (...) radical gas nitric oxide and natriuretic peptides, both of which are produced in the heart, have emerged as endogenous inhibitors of maladaptive hypertrophy signalling. Overall, it appears that cardiac hypertrophy is controlled by an interplay of pro‐ and antihypertrophic signalling networks. This delicate balance can tip towards adaptation or heart failure. In the future, patients living with cardiac disease may benefit from therapeutic strategies targeting maladaptive hypertrophy signalling pathways. BioEssays 26:608–615, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Taxation is a vestige of feudalism and monarchy. It persists because of the mistaken belief that government is somehow entitled to a portion of our labor or assets. This article challenges that belief from a philosophical perspective and offers a different viewpoint.

We address Mark Tschaepe’s response to Tibor Solymosi, in which Tschaepe argues that neuropragmatism needs to be coupled with humility in order to redress “dopamine democracy,” Tschaepe’s term for our contemporary situation of smartphone addiction that undermines democracy. We reject Tschaepe’s distinction between humility and fallibility, arguing that audacious fallibility is all we need. We take the opportunity presented by Tschaepe’s constructive criticism of neuropragmatism to reassert some central themes of neuropragmatism. We close with discussion of Bywater’s (...) method of apprenticeship, as an imaginative education for creative democracy, thereby rejecting Tschaepe’s claim that neuropragmatism lacks a pedagogical method. (shrink)

The result of the author's extensive practical experience: a decade in computer process control using large scale systems, another decade in machine pattern-recognition for vision systems, and nearly a decade dealing with artificial intelligence and expert systems. These real-life projects have taught Vámos a critical appreciation of, and respect for, both abstract theory and the practical methodology that grows out of—and, in turn, shapes—those theories.Machine representation means a level of formalization that can be expressed by the instruments of mathematics, (...) whereas programming is not more and not less than a special linguistic translation of these mathematical formulae. How these all are related and controlled is a most practical philosophical and computation professional task. Wide experience in the practical fields of computer science, and the research of the underlying theoretical issues have led Vámos to the development of the attitude and activity of constructive skepticism. (shrink)

In recent work, Mark Johnson has argued that a scientifically updated version of John Dewey’s pragmatism affords human beings the opportunity to feel at home in the world. This feeling at home, however, is not fully problematized, nor explored, nor resolved by Johnson. Rather, Johnson and his collaborators, Don Tucker (2021) and Jay Schulkin (2023), defend this updated pragmatism within the historical development of the sciences of life and mind from the twentieth century to the present day. A central theme (...) in this defense is the affinity pragmatism has with neurophenomenology, especially the enactivism seen in 4E cognition. Another theme is the future orientation of pragmatism, especially as it is focused on developments in cybernetics and artificial intelligence. Given Johnson’s previous work on expanding the number of E’s to 7, and other pragmatist suggestions for more, I argue that neuropragmatism’s development of Dewey’s conception of experience as organism-environment transaction (symbolized by the diphthong, Œ) is critical for understanding what Johnson and Tucker call the cybernetic revolution as an enchanting and welcoming future instead of a disenchanting and alienating one. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper argues that generosity as a moral virtue is only consistently and fully possible to practise in the kind of polity that upholds natural individual human rights, including the basic negative right to private property. The paper sketches a characterisation of generosity and explains the sense in which it can be a moral virtue. Some of the assumptions underlying the concept of moral virtue are considered and it is argued that contrary to some recent claims, it is possible (...) to conceptualise as well as to practise moral virtues in our age. Yet it is also shown that certain political prerequisites are necessary for practising generosity. Furthermore, it is shown that there cannot be any generosity involved in a polity in which one is forced to share one's wealth with those who might be the beneficiaries of generous conduct. Finally, it is argued that even in a polity with a very limited government some acts of official generosity are possible. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with what I believe is the epistemological mission of Kant’s doctrine of taste. The third Critique inherits two problems from the first. The evident one is that the categorial constitution of nature must be complemented with the notion of purposiveness. The less evident one is that the transcendental theory of experience needs a common sense in order to secure a common objectivity. The judgment of taste, conceived of by Kant as a ‘cognition in general’ (...) not restricted to either the particular subject or the particular object, offers a solution. It turns out to be a judgment that cannot be made without assuming the purposiveness of nature and the uniformity of the cognizing subjects. (shrink)

The first part of this project deals with the more recent historical discussions of the topic, Most of which focus on the views of aristotle and j s mill. These two authors turn out to be the focus of attention of most writers who wish to consider the major historical reflections on happiness, Ones that have shaped our thinking on the topic. The second part of this project deals with contemporary original thinking about happiness. Yet here, Too, The (...) major themes on the topic tend to hark back to either the aristotelian or the millian line of analysis. In this section various putative components of happiness or philosophical topics and methods related to understanding happiness are discussed one by one. The paper concludes with some reflections of the authors about the merits of a eudaimonistic conception of happiness. (shrink)

Among classical liberals and libertarians a serious debate has been afoot about whether any sort of government is justified. Murray N. Rothbard, Jan Narveson, Bruce Benson and Randy Barnett are usually listed as the main skeptics, while Ayn Rand, Robert Nozick, John Hospers, among others, are listed as defenders of the morality of limited government. In this paper I argue that once properly understood, the two sides aren’t in fundamental disagreement. Anarcho-libertarians do embrace the idea that men and women in (...) a free society are justified in establishing a legal order in defense of their basic and derivative rights, and this is also what limited government proponents advance as the basis for the system they deem to be just. I argue that no fundamental difference exists between these two legal orders. The monopoly anarcho-libertarians claim limited government proponents wrongfully sanction is, in fact, not a coercive monopoly and the legal order proposed by anarchists would also have this monopolistic characteristic. This should put an end to this fruitless dispute and free the energies on both sides to mount a really important and henceforth united defense of the free society with its just legal order.Parmi les libéraux classiques et les libertariens un important débat concerne la question de savoir si une quelconque forme de gouvernement est justifiée. Murray N. Rothbard, Jan Narveson, Bruce Benson et Randy Barnett sont habituellement classés parmi les principaux sceptiques, alors qu’Ayn Rand, Robert Nozick, John Hospers, entre autres, sont plutôt classés en tant que défenseurs de la moralité d’un gouvernement limité. Dans cet article, je soutiens qu’une fois correctement compris, les deux clans ne sont pas fondamentalement en désaccord. Les anarcho-libertariens soutiennent l’idée que les hommes et les femmes dans une société libre sont en droit d’établir un ordre législatif pour défendre leurs droits fondamentaux et leurs droits dérivés, et c’est aussi ce que les partisans du gouvernement limité proposent comme fondement du système qu’ils considèrent être juste. Je soutiens qu’il n’existe pas de différence fondamentale entre ces deux ordres législatifs. Le monopole du gouvernement limité que les partisans anarcholibertariens sanctionnent à tort est, en fait, non pas un monopole coercitif, et l’ordre législatif proposé par les anarchistes aurait lui aussi cette caractéristique monopolistique.Cela devrait mettre un terme à cette dispute stérile et libérer les énergies des deux côtés pour ériger à l’avenir une défense unie réellement importante pour une société libre avec un ordre juridique juste. (shrink)

In this provocative monograph, Tibor Machan explores the principles of truth, reason, and ideology, with particular respect to the profound political, economic, ...

The practice of prenatal diagnosis has brought with it the utilization of pregnancy termination as a preventive approach. In this paper the genetic/teratologic, fetal and maternal indications for termination of pregnancy used in Hungary are described, as well as the legal requirements and the proposed mode of termination at the different stages of gestation. The author is the director of the largest prenatal genetic counseling service in Hungary. Keywords: elective abortion, medico-legal aspects, prenatal diagnosis, genetic disorders, Hungary, bioethics CiteULike (...) Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The essay starts out with defining the biblical concept of sin in the Old and the New Testaments. The literal knowledge of divine truth is distinguished from its truthful and spiritual interpretation. A further distinction should be made between the Creator of life (God) and the medium or “intermediary creator” (man) of life. I argue for the “single wholeness” of the human race and for the unity of human responsibility in bioethics. In delineating the teaching of the Church on (...) abortion and family planning, I show that the healing of all human diseases, from traditional interventions to genetic ones, is a Christian duty and is in accordance with Christ's mission on earth as long as one has not been directly or indirectly involved in “reproducing” or “designing” one's descendants or destroying or damaging human life even at its very beginnings. (shrink)

We revisit the sequential search problem by Hey. In a 2 ×\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\times $$\end{document} 2 factorial design, varying fixed and random cost treatments with and without recall, we address open research questions that were originally stated by Hey. Our results provide clear evidence for Hey’s conjecture that recall negatively affects performance in sequential search. With experience, however, search behavior with and without recall converges toward the optimal reservation rule. We (...) further find that the utilization of optimal reservation rules is independent from the stochastic nature of the search cost. (shrink)

Tibor R. Machan argues that William Dwyer's review of his book, Initiative: Human Agency and S odety (The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Fall 2001), assumes that compatibilism is coherent. Machan argues that compatibilism is simply hard determinism with some soft edges but as such it is not coherent. In light of this, the agent-causation-based thesis of human initiative (or freedom of the human will) that Machan defends is superior to its alternatives.

Tibor R. Machan explores how to present Rand's ethics in an introductory college course on moral philosophy. Despite their inclusion in some textbooks, Rand's ideas often get misrepresented. For example, James Rachels' work treats her as a subjective egoist, ignoring Rand's own focus on human nature and the individual's identity in the formulation of guidelines to personal conduct. In teaching Rand's ethical egoism, Machan examines several metaethical topics, including the nature of ethical knowledge, the challenges to such knowledge posed (...) by Hume's and Moore's arguments, and a comparative analysis with conventionalism, naturalism, intuitionism, subjectivism, and rationalism. (shrink)

Are we able to make objective moral judgments? This perennial philosophical topic needs often to be revisited because it is central to human life. Judging how people conduct themselves, the institutions they devise, whether, in short, they are doing what's right or what's wrong, is ubiquitous. In this essay I defend the objectivity of ethical judgments by deploying a neo-Aristotelian naturalism by which to keep the “is-ought” gap at bay and place morality on an objective footing. I do this (...) class='Hi'>with the aid of the ideas of Ayn Rand as well as, but only by implication and association, those of Martha Nussbaum and Philippa Foot. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

I propose we discuss pluralistic humanism as an alternative to both atheism and traditional theism in an effort to establish a democratic faith to which we, despite our differences, can bind ourselves. I draw on the thought of American pragmatists to articulate a constructive criticism of new atheists. This criticism primarily focuses on the unacknowledged affinities between religion and scientific atheism – namely, a naive realism and a conversion experience – with the hope of using such common ground as (...) a starting point for not only shared experience but for self-examination. I conclude with the proposal that we take up a Deweyan conception of democracy as a common faith aimed at effecting religious or spiritual experiences despite the traditional oppression of institutional religion. (shrink)

Words and phrases must be interpreted within the proper cultural and contemporary political and historical context. In particular, the language of politics is distinguished by the use of specific terms and phrases which often allude to other associated meanings. This means that caution must be exercised when interpreting the terms used not only within the context of the other language, but often also within its own linguistic context. The translator or commentator has to be familiar with the language code (...) used in the given environment and within the cultural biases of that particular society so that meanings are not lost and the often crucial connotations are not misinterpreted. Political rhetoric often employs words and language in a manipulative yet frequently subtle manner. This paper analyzes examples of shifts in language code by looking at a number of cases in Japan and their cultural construction where loss of integrity and backstage practices are at stake. (shrink)

Roy Scranton argues for a new philosophical humanism as the best response to the existential crisis of the Anthropocene, the new geological epoch for which human industrial activity is responsible. This threat from climate change, Scranton argues, is better met through what he calls photohumanism than by science, technology, engineering, and mathematics alone. This new humanism shares many affinities with pluralistic humanism. A key concern is political action, which is problematized by what Tschaepe calls dopamine democracy. Scranton shares this (...) concern, but his approach puts too great an emphasis on binaries, such as culture and nature, mind and body, and life and death. I offer the philosophical method of reconstruction, as situated within pluralistic humanism and the philosophy of John Dewey. In introducing the need for reconstruction as a method for doing philosophy in a new but ancient sense of learning to die, I reconstruct photohumanism and offer the Deweyan ideal of democracy for overcoming the problem of the Anthropocene. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze and discuss Jennifer Saul’s account of the famous Gricean notions of ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ and the alleged conflict between them and the so- called Speaker- Meaning Exhaustiveness Thesis (SMET), which is standardly attributed to Grice in the literature. SMET declares that speaker- meaning divides exhaustively into what is said and what is (conventionally or nonconventionally) implicated by the speaker. After a detailed interpretation of Saul’s position, we argue that her analysis partly (...) misconstrues the relation between Grice’s theory of speaker- meaning and his normative account of conversational implicature. First of all, because SMET is not a genuine part of the Gricean theory of language and meaning – Grice was never committed to it. Secondly, Saul’s interpretation of the Gricean account of conversational implicature does not reflect accurately his original ideas. Although we agree with Saul that conversational implicature has an essential normative aspect, her account cannot capture well the real nature of this normativity, since it does not identify its source and does not delineate its scope. Finally, we present an alternative, speaker- oriented normative interpretation of Grice’s account of conversational implicatures, and argue that it fits better with the Gricean picture of communication and handles better the various problematic cases of conversational implicature than Saul’s mainly audience- oriented interpretation. (shrink)

The issue of whether logic has an ontological base—rests, ultimately, on the principles or nature of reality—is constantly with us. In this paper I revisit it, drawing on a piece I wrote back in 1969, for the early incarnation of Reason magazine. I conclude that the Aristotelian idea that logic tracks reality is sound and those opposed—conventionalists, pragmatists, conceptualists, Kantians, et al.—have it wrong.

Aristotelian ethics is still very promising, mainly because of its meta-ethical naturalism. As in medicine, what’s good versus bad is based on knowledge of the nature of something. With the addition of a strong doctrine of voluntary action, the morally good life is one within which one pursues one’s human flourishing . An obstacle is Aristotle’s essentialism whereby he stresses what is distinctive about human beings, not what is a matter of their nature, as the standard of right versus (...) wrong conduct. If this is amended in Aristotle what emerges is what some have called a genuine naturalist, biocentric ethical eudaimonism. Here I sketch the case for this amended Aristotelian ethical view. (shrink)

Many may benefit from revisiting the natural rights support for the fully free society even though the case is on record in several books and numerous scholarly pieces. Here I provide a sketch of that support, with a plethora of references for those who would like to explore the full case.The basic point is that adult human beings are moral agents and as such require in their communities respect for–and at times expert protection of–their individual natural rights. This is (...) what gives rise to a polity of very limited government or law. Like referees at a game, whoever maintains and defends the law must stick to that job and not stray into other projects lest the work become corrupted. Such a society will not guarantee good conduct or prosperity but will have the best chance at these. (shrink)

Society has to be understood as a process of fast changes and slow transformations . This is what has been happening in Central Europe, where the big changes of 1989–1990 were preceded by several small social, political and ideological transformations. When analysing Central European societies, one should also remember that there is an ‘official’ society and a ‘hidden’ society.In addition, the relation of state and civil society is deformed since in most cases the civil sphere is repressed and undeveloped due (...) to the predominance of the ‘official state’. In such societies, you cannot find real hegemony but only dominance, which is practiced by the state not only in the sphere of economy, society and culture, but also in and through ideology.The essence of modern totalitarian society cannot be understood without addressing the permanent existence of unofficial, ‘civil’ ideologies penetrating the ‘hidden’ society at the same time as the ‘official’ ideology. Apart from the slow transformation of ideologies and the crisis of ‘official’ ideology, the strengthening of ‘hidden’ ideology is also required for revolutionary changes. This is how a historically new situation with new ideologies can come into being, in clear contrast to the renewal of old ideologles, which generates a mixture of the old and the new. A look at what happened in Central Europe, but particularly Hungary, should clarify the point. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper argues that the sort of liberty associated with a capitalist economic system is of particular value because it ensures moral self‐responsibility. Two conceptions of freedom are considered but only one is invoked. It is contended that one, namely, positive freedom, is actually a kind of ability or power. One's positive freedom may be lost as a result of events not initiated by other human beings. Negative freedom, by contrast, is a distinctively normative notion. It is a (...) social condition that members of a community ought to maintain out of respect for human dignity, that is, each person's responsibility to choose to live rightly. It is argued that since ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, persons can only be morally responsible for what they can choose to do. If they lack negative freedom, then in addition to natural limitations, they will also be limited by the voluntary conduct of others. Yet this limitation could be prevented by the choices of others, including governments, to secure for all persons their negative freedom. Because of the universality of the requirement that each person be left free, such negative freedom is the quintessential public good. Finally, the concrete expression of negative freedom is the right to private property— one's sphere of moral authority. This makes the capitalist economic system an essential aspect of the society that secures negative freedom. (shrink)

The paper argues that the idea of prima facie rights implies insurmountable difficulties in connection with the function such rights are said to have in a scheme of justice. G vlastos's version of prima facie rights theories is scrutinized as typical and more advanced than others. The paper shows that natural rights are contextually absolute; they cannot (morally) be overruled in a context of normal political circumstances but may have to be disregarded whenever politics is impossible. Vlastos's insight is (...) preserved without sacrificing the integrity of a scheme of justice based on natural rights. (shrink)

In James P. Sterba's new collection of papers on justice, one of the contributions comes from Alison Jaggar. It is an essay written in the tradition of sociolinguistic theorizing, whereby a major problem with the relationship between men and women concerns their different uses of language, their distinctive ways of communicating, arguing, and talking.

This paper explores the meaning of the word “felony” in thirteenth and fourteenth century England, i.e., during the first two centuries of the English criminal trial jury. To compile a working definition of felony, the paper presents examples of the language of felony drawn from literary and religious sources, in addition to considering the word’s more formulaic appearance in legal records. The paper then analyzes cases ending in acquittal or pardon, highlighting the factors that might take a criminal case out (...) of the realm of felony. It suggests that the very definition of felony and felonious behavior—and thus the essence of criminal responsibility—may be bound up with the idea of mens rea during this period. The paper aims to uncover broader societal understandings of the nature of guilt and innocence, and to highlight connections and disconnections between the formal criminal law of felony, with its heavy emphasis on capital punishment, and popular and ecclesiastical understandings of culpability. (shrink)